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SECURITY INFORMATION

MAR 4 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS

SUBJECT: Report on Project BOSPEED (SS JUANITA)

1. Attached herewith as a matter of interest to you is a report on OPC project BOSPEED which was approved in June 1950. This project called for the fitting out of a ship with broadcasting equipment designed for the beaming of black propaganda to Albania, in connection with the BOPIEND program. At the time this proposed project was under review, considerable misgivings were expressed as to the feasibility or desirability of such an undertaking, but it was finally decided to go ahead, in view of the fact that suitable land-based facilities for black broadcasting did not appear at that time to be practicable.

2. A great many things have gone wrong in the implementation of this project, and it was finally suspended in October 1951. The ship is now being offered for sale in the Mediterranean. No actual broadcasting ever took place.

3. Much of the onus for the failure can be attributed to shortcomings within OPC. These include lack of seasoned judgment on the part of various OPC officers concerned with the project; lack of continuous, adequate supervision; unfortunate selection of a vessel; etc. On the other hand, the communications equipment provided proved totally inadequate for the contemplated operation. Although tests were conducted in the United States which indicated that the medium wave signal could be received satisfactorily, actual tests in the operational area proved that this was not the case under the field conditions encountered. In addition, serious mistakes seem to have been made in the procurement of radar equipment. (See paragraphs 2 and 4 of the attached report, "BOSPEED - Summary of Principal Failures and Reasons for Them.")

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4. This constitutes

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4. This constitutes an expensive lesson for OPC. So far as the communications equipment is concerned, I understand that your Operations Staff has indicated that it is all salvageable.

5. The file is transmitted to you for whatever value it may have as an analysis of past operations.

[]
for

[]
Acting Assistant Director
for Policy Coordination

Attachment:

Report on BOSPEED - summary of
failures and Reasons

TAP/mgd	19 February 1952
OD/OP	ADCO
CEE	DD/P
CEE-1	AMD
COD	SAI
SD/RE	TAP

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Summary of Principal Failures, and Reasons for Them

1. The Ship

The vessel selected was not sufficiently seaworthy for continuous duty in the rough seas encountered in the area of operations. Its construction made it impractical as a carrier of medium-wave equipment in even moderately heavy weather. This led to not only an unacceptable loss of efficiency, but also to real discomfort and actual danger to the communications personnel (danger of short circuits from water taken aboard, etc.). The type of electrical wiring on the ship made it unsuitable for extended working. There was insufficient generator power to operate both the ship and the broadcasting equipment simultaneously, with efficiency.

In this connection, it now develops that extensive basic repairs are required. One engine is gone, the other half gone, considerable dry rot exists, and the water tanks are in bad shape. Whether some of these conditions were incipient at the time of purchase, or whether they developed later, cannot be determined accurately.

2. Communications Equipment

There appears to have been a thorough lack of coordination on this between OPC and the Communications Division. There is no record to indicate that the detailed requirements for operational use were ever presented in written form to COMINT; apparently this highly important matter was largely handled on an informal oral basis. In any event, the equipment provided proved inadequate for the assigned task, and as a result no actual broadcasting was ever accomplished. Tests of the equipment were conducted in the United States with completely satisfactory results, but actual field conditions encountered were so greatly at variance with the conditions under which the tests were performed that their results were meaningless. Principal differences in this connection were:

a. The tests were conducted during early morning hours, when most broadcasting stations were off the air, whereas the

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operational use intended was to be during the early evening.

b. The fact that the noise level in the Balkan area is considerably higher than in the U.S. was apparently not given full consideration.

c. The over-crowded channels which exist in the operational area and which thus cause an unusual degree of interference were apparently not given sufficient weight.

As a result of these tests in the U.S., it was concluded that the medium wave signal from this equipment could be received adequately at distances ranging from 175 to 300 miles. Tests in the operational area, however, revealed that the signal could not be received at any distance from 110 to 300 miles.

It should be noted here that no tests were conducted in the field for two and a half months after the ship had arrived in Greek waters. There seems to be no logical explanation for this.

(It should also be noted that the actual installation of the communications equipment was done in a superior manner. It was camouflaged and hidden in such a way that it completely escaped detection, even under fairly close scrutiny.)

3. Cover

The cover for this ship was that of a marine biological expedition. After the cover was established, however, there seems to have been no effort to make it effective. Three points are significant in this connection:

a. The provisioning and fitting out of the ship in Baltimore were conducted in a manner inconsistent with the established cover.

b. The crew, including the captain, were insufficiently or misleadingly, briefed. This led to some dissatisfaction on the part of the crew. In the case of the captain, it nearly led to a complete blowing of the project when he reported to ONI representatives in Miami that he was suspicious of the whole undertaking.

c. No attempt was made after the ship was actually in the operational area to work at the cover. No fishing nets, specimens or any other logical appurtenance to the ship's ostensible mission were provided, nor was any member of the ship's complement briefed sufficiently to enable him to put up a plausible front.

In addition to

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In addition to the above factors, the very type of ship selected was conspicuously impractical for the required task and attracted undue attention.

4. Miscellaneous Equipment

The selection, procurement and dispatch of certain equipment seems to have been handled with something less than maximum efficiency.

Notably:

a. A radar installation was procured that weighed over two tons and that has been described as suitable for a Navy light cruiser. It was obviously totally unsuited for this vessel. Further, it was dispatched to Greece by air freight at a cost of \$1500.

b. An outboard motor was procured for the ship's dinghy, and was sent to Greece. Although the dinghy was only six feet long, the motor procured was of about 20 horsepower and was very nearly as large as the boat for which it was intended.

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